



Current state of the sovereign debt crisis

University of Saint Andrews, February 2012

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
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I. Introduction


General government deficit



Sources: Eurostat ja European Commission.

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General government debt




Sources: Eurostat and European Commission.

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General government debt

United States Japan United Kingdom



Source: European Commission.


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General government deficit

United States

Japan


United Kingdom



Source: European Commission.

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Euro area sovereign CDS prices




Source: Bloomberg. 5-year CDS prices.
Quotations for Greece are no longer regularly available.

Euro area bank CDS prices




Source: Bloomberg.
5-year CDS prices.

Sovereign yield spreads vis-à-vis Germany (10 y)



Source: Bloomberg.


GDP, GIIPS



Source: Eurostat.

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
Inflation, GIIPS



Source: Eurostat.

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Current account, GIIPS



Source: European Commission forecast, Autumn 2011.


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II. Design faults?

Current account and public deficits in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain in 2003-2009



Assessments on Greece 2006-2007

- ◆ IMF (Article IV report, Dec 2006):
 - *” Significant fiscal consolidation was put in place in 2005–06, but further deficit cuts are needed.”*
 - *“Vulnerabilities have developed in the form of very high credit growth, persistent inflationary pressures, eroding competitiveness, and an unsustainably large current account deficit.”*
- ◆ OECD (Country report, May 2007):
 - *“There has been substantial [fiscal] consolidation since 2004.”*
 - *“Losses in competitiveness may ultimately undermine growth performance.”*
 - *“The clearest sign of macroeconomic tension is an increase in the current account deficit.”*
- ◆ Broad picture in 2006-2007:
 - Fiscal situation seen to be on the mend.
 - External deficit seen as a vulnerability.
 - But no alarm bells, no perceived need for drastic action.

Assessments on Ireland 2006-2007


- ◆ IMF (Article IV report, June 2006):
 - *“Economic policies have been in line with Fund policy advice.”*
 - *“Financial system continues to perform well, but rapid credit growth is a vulnerability.”*
 - *“concentration of lending in property-related sectors... banks’ reliance on wholesale funding...”*
 - *“Regulatory and supervisory framework has been strengthened in line with the recommendations of the 2000 FSAP.”*
- ◆ OECD (Economic survey, March 2006)
 - *“The fiscal position is healthy.”*
 - *“House prices may have overshot fundamentals to some extent, although this does not imply that they will fall significantly.”*
- ◆ Broad picture in 2006:
 - Growth performance based on genuine productivity miracle, strong public finances.
 - Well-supervised financial sector, but property sector risks recognized.
 - Again, no alarms sounding!

Current account – the missing link

- ◆ Before the crisis,
 - Current accounts within a monetary union were seen as largely unimportant.
 - Balance-of-payments crises were seen as largely impossible:
 - BOP crises traditionally involve run on a currency, forcing interest rates up.
 - But monetary union shares a common currency and interest rate, so there is no risk of speculative attack.
- ◆ Now we know that:
 - Sovereigns within a currency union are leveraged entities and can be subject to a run,
 - ... and once a sovereign is targeted, the financial sector goes down with it.
 - As long as solvency is defined along national borders, the monetary union alone does not shield from a BOP crisis.

A regulatory failure?

- ◆ Stability and growth pact focuses only on public finances.
 - More generally, national imbalances and competitiveness were not included.
 - The 2003 revision of the Stability and Growth Pact clearly unfortunate.
 - The new Pact was not necessarily much worse than the old, but revision had wrong motivations.
 - Signalled lack of political will for macroeconomic coordination.

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- ◆ The "No bail out" –clause had no real bite.
 - No enforcement mechanism.
 - ◆ Integration of euro countries had not progressed sufficiently far.
 - In particular, regulation and supervision of financial markets had remained entirely national.
 - Financial markets did not impose sufficient discipline on member countries.



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III. EU and euro area reforms

TREATY ON STABILITY, COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION

- ◆ To foster budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact
- ◆ To strengthen the coordination of economic policies
- ◆ To improve the governance of the euro area (“Six Pact”)
 - Fiscal surveillance and enforcement
 - Macroeconomic imbalances and enforcement
 - More automatic sanctions
- ◆ The treaty shall enter into force on 1 January 2013 if ratified by 12 euro area countries.
- ◆ The aim is to incorporate this treaty into the legal framework of the European Union within five years.

Fiscal compact

- ◆ The budgetary position of the general government should be balanced or in surplus.
- ◆ Medium-term objective: structural budget deficit not to exceed 0.5 % of GDP.
- ◆ Structural deficit of at most 1 % of GDP allowed if the ratio of government debt is significantly below 60 % and risks in terms of long-term sustainability are low.
- ◆ Contracting parties may temporarily deviate from their medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it only in exceptional circumstances as defined in Stability and Growth Pact.

Fiscal compact (II)

- ◆ The rules should be incorporated in the national law of the contracting parties at the latest one year after the entry into force of the treaty.
- ◆ The provisions in the national law should be binding, permanent and preferably constitutional or otherwise guaranteed to be respected throughout the national budgetary processes.
 - Compliance ultimately judged by European Court of Justice.
- ◆ A correction mechanism to be triggered automatically in the event of significant deviations as specified in the revised Stability and Growth Pact.

Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM)


- ◆ European Commission may initiate an excessive deficit procedure which includes deficit targets over several years.
- ◆ Automatic sanctions on euro area countries with excessively high budget deficits; can be avoided only with a reversed qualified majority.
- ◆ The permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to replace the temporary EFSF should be operational in mid-2012. The lending capacity of ESM will be 500 billion euros.

- ◆ The objective of the reforms is to move toward a "Maastricht plus" type system, not a complete fiscal union.
 - Each country has responsibility of its economy.
 - The aim is to strictly apply the commonly accepted rules.
- ◆ Eurobonds?
 - Several proposals, perhaps best known is the idea of blue bonds and red bonds.
 - Would move Europe (excluding UK?) strongly toward federalist direction
 - It seems that there is not very much support, except in the problem countries.
 - Would probably require changing a change in the EU Treaty.
 - Not a tool to resolve the current crisis?



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IV. Policies in the crisis countries

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- ◆ Necessary to achieve a turnaround in the public debt to GDP ratio and then proceed with reduction of indebtedness.
 - This will take 10-20 years.
 - ◆ Consolidation of public finances
 - To convince the markets and the creditors
 - Negative impact on economic growth in the short run.
 - ◆ Structural policies
 - To improve economic growth in the medium to long run
 - Improving the legitimacy of government and administration
 - Achieving the positive effects will take time.

Greece vs. Italy

% of GDP, 2010	Greece	Italy
Private consumption expenditure	74,5	60,5
Government consumption expenditure	18,2	21,1
Investments	16,6	19,7
Export	21,5	26,7
Import	30,4	28,6
Current Account (92 – 10)	-8,3	-0,1

Source: European Commission.

Challenges for Greece

- ◆ 2012 will be the 5th year with falling GDP.
 - ◆ Debt-GDP ratio will be nearly 200 % at the end of the year unless something is done.
 - ◆ Major changes in the economy:
 - Private consumption must go down a long time..
 - Massive need to move productive resources from public and closed private sector to export production.
 - Where are the new industries for exports?
 - ◆ Major program for public sector consolidation and reform.
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- ◆ A second aid package under negotiation.
 - ◆ Voluntary restructuring of public debts held by the private sector under negotiation.


Challenges for Italy

- ◆ There are some strong private sectors and private sector financing is working so far. But:
- ◆ Liquidity crisis because of high public debt.
- ◆ Too big to fail?
 - Country's own actions decisive.
 - The new government has had a good start?
- ◆ Balancing of public finances is necessary (and should be achievable),
- ◆ But weak growth performance necessitates structural reforms to improve long-term sustainability.

Challenges for Portugal


- ◆ External adjustment gathered pace lately and structural adjustment program started off fairly well.
- ◆ But:
 - Weak growth and structural problems deep rooted.
 - Debt flows have helped to avoid adjustment in domestic demand, debt servicing burden has become problematic.
 - Needs for relative price changes to improve competitiveness, but probably smaller than eg Greece.
 - Refinancing of public and private debt remains extremely challenging.

Reprioritisation of resources towards tradable sector has seemingly started



Source: national authorities

External adjustment speeding up, but large debt burden keeps debt servicing still high




Lähde: national statistics



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
V. Examples of successful (?) adjustment

GDP: Estonia, Latvia, Ireland and Iceland



Sources: Eurostat, National authorities.

Government debt: Estonia, Latvia, Ireland and Iceland



Sources: Eurostat (Q3 for 2011), Iceland (for 2000-2004) national authorities and for 2011 IMF forecast.



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Thank you!